PAGAN REGENERATION
A STUDY OF MYSTERY INITIATIONS IN THE GRAECO-ROMAN WORLD
BY HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY
[b. 1890 d. 1962]
Chicago., Ill., The University of Chicago Press
[1929, copyright not renewed]
CHAPTER IX
THE MYSTICISM OF PHILO
TWO religions of Egyptian origin have already been investigated: the cult
of Isis and the garbled philosophy of "Hermes Trismegistus." Both were typical
gentile systems, characteristic products of Hellenistic syncretism. Each cultivated
its own peculiar type of individual regeneration: the Isiac a realistic, emotional
experience conditioned by the proper performance of cult rites, and the Hermetic
a subjective, intellectualized experience all but completely divorced from ceremonialism.
At the beginning of the Christian era, there was a third Egyptian syncretism
which was characterized by a mysticism peculiarly its own, yet resembling in
important ways the other types of mystical experience current in Alexandria.
This, strange to say, was a Jewish syncretism--the religion of Philo the philosopher,
the great Jewish contemporary of Jesus and Paul.
I
There is no man of Paul's period more important for an understanding of the
Christian Apostle or of Hellenistic Christianity than is Philo of Alexandria.
Even the casual student of the times cannot but be impressed by certain outstanding
similarities between the environments and experiences of Philo and Paul. Both
were Jews of the Diaspora, and each was reared in one of the great centers of
Graeco-Oriental civilization; for Alexandria, even more markedly than Tarsus,
was a focal point for Hellenistic culture with its characteristic blend of elements
oriental and occidental. Reared in similar environments each attained a certain
prominence in his own racial group. For Paul it was an early attainment when,
as a young rabbinical student of favored family, he "outstripped many of his
own age and race in his special ardor for the traditions of his fathers," and
became the zealous defender of Jewish orthodoxy against Hellenizing Messianists.
As for Philo, being related to the Alabarch Alexander, he was a member of one
of the "best families" in the Alexandrian Jewish community. This fact is fixed
whether or not the assertion of Jerome that he was of priestly race is credited.
That Philo himself, at least in his later years, rose to a position of influence
on his own account is shown by the fact that when he was of advanced age he
headed the Jewish embassy to the Emperor Caligula in A.D. 40. Thus Philo, like
Paul, crowned his career with a journey to the imperial city, the Alexandrian
as head of a delegation of protesting provincials, and the Tarsian as a propagandist
on trial for his life.
Not only were Philo and Paul both Jews of the Diaspora prominent among their
fellow-countrymen but they were also both thoroughly en rapport with the gentile
life of the times. This their own writings certify even in matters of vocabulary
and style. Paul wrote good Hellenistic Greek in a manner suggestive alike of
the informal letterwriting of the period and of the fervent exhortations of
popular street preachers. Philo, on the other hand, formed his diction according
to that of Greek classical authors, the influence of Plato being particularly
notable. He was familiar with the writings of the great Greek poets also, Homer
and Euripides and the others, and on occasion he quoted from them. He was acquainted
with the works of Phidias and mentioned them in no uncomplimentary manner--a
remarkable thing for a Jew to do. To the varied play of contemporary gentile
life he was also responsive. Like Paul he was well acquainted with the athletic
festivals of the Graeco-Roman world, and had a detailed familiarity with the
rules of the games and the habits of competitors. Also he possessed extensive
knowledge of the ordinary curriculum of gentile education and discussed it with
real insight. The art of music and the practice of medicine commanded his attention.
Furthermore, he made extensive observations and pronouncements on political
and social problems, thus displaying a keen interest in these important phases
of the secular life. Because he, a prominent Jew of the Diaspora, was thus open
to gentile influences, the study of his religious experience is especially significant
in relation to the experiences of Hellenists generally.
Another reason why Philo is particularly important for a study of religious
developments in first-century life is because his writings, like the Hermetic
literature, represent a blend of philosophy and religion such as was characteristic
of the age. Here there is contrast between Philo and Paul. The latter was consciously
scornful of gentile philosophies. For the classical systems of Hellas he had
little use, and it was to Stoicism chiefly that he was responsive. Philo, on
the other hand, had a hearty admiration for the philosophy of the Greeks. Among
gentile authors the philosophers were the ones whom he most highly esteemed.
Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno, and Cleanthes seemed to him divine men and members
of a sacred company. But he showed the greatest fondness of all for Plato "the
great" and "the most sacred," and probably he would have declared himself to
be more indebted to Plato than to any other thinker of Greece. Certainly his
own system, if we may thus characterize it, bore many of the characteristic
marks of Platonism. His prejudice in favor of this classical philosophy was
generally recognized in early times and gave rise to the proverb, "Either Plato
philonizes or Philo platonizes."
Notwithstanding this predilection, however, Philo borrowed freely from other
systems as well wherever he found elements that were useful to himself. Pythagorean
tradition was particularly attractive to him. He spoke of this school with veneration
and was himself characterized as a Pythagorean by Clement, of his own city.
But he was at least equally indebted to Stoicism, and recent writers have tended
to emphasize his affinities in this direction. On the philosophical side, Philo
presents a notable example of the eclectic tendencies of the time, and one reason
why it is so difficult to reduce his thinking to a definite system is because
of its syncretistic character.
In spite of his appreciation of Greek philosophy, Philo yet remained at heart
a religionist consciously loyal to the practices of his fathers. It was not
one of the thinkers of Greece but Moses himself who was the greatest of lawgivers
and philosophers, he believed. The fundamental assumption on which his whole
elaborate and disparate system was based was the absolute authority of the Mosaic
Law. In the Torah he found the perfect and supreme revelation of the divine
wisdom. Each word in it was written by Moses at specific, divine dictation,
or at least under the direct inspiration of God. While the Pentateuch stood
on a solitary level above all the other sacred writings, Philo regarded the
prophets also as interpreters of God, who made use of them in revealing his
will to men. This Jew of the Diaspora, living at a considerable distance from
the Jerusalem center of his religion, still found himself in sympathy with the
teachings of the prophets and maintained an intense loyalty to the Law.
With his admiration for Greek philosophy and his loyalty to his own religion,
Philo found himself in a dilemma. He was unwilling to yield either the philosophy
or the religion; so he sought to reconcile them. In this attempt he was but
trying to do what other thoughtful men of his own race in the same environment
had endeavored to do before him. Over a century and a half earlier, Aristobulus
had worked out certain analogies between his ancestral faith and the speculations
of Plato, which he explained by the assumption that the Greek philosopher borrowed
his ideas from Moses. Taking this as his cue, Philo proceeded to read into the
Pentateuch whatever he considered worth while in the different systems of gentile
philosophy. This was, of course, a difficult and violent procedure; but Philo
readily accomplished it by means of the allegorical method of interpretation,
an instrument borrowed from the Stoics. Thus, partly to satisfy his own mind,
doubtless, and partly to make the treasures of gentile philosophy available
for his fellow countrymen, but most of all to commend the Jewish religion to
fair-minded Gentiles, Philo wrote his voluminous works. To philosophical speculation
he sought to lend the authority of religion and to religion, on the other hand,
he endeavored to give intellectual respectability by the addition of philosophical
accretions. In working out this blend of philosophy and religion, he was operating
in harmony with the tendencies of the times as the development of Neo-Pythagoreanism,
Hermetism, Gnosticism, and the inception of Neo-Platonism indicate. For the
very reason that Philo interpreted religious experience in religio-philosophical
terminology, his interpretation has peculiar interest and value.
In view of Philo's earnest endeavor to combine disparate elements, Jewish
and Hellenistic, religious and philosophical, it is not strange that his formulations
should contain many contradictory features. From the study of his writings it
is impossible to reconstruct any clear-cut, consistent system of thought. In
the reading of Philo one is continually encountering contradictions and discrepancies,
and it is a constant problem to know just which of two incongruous statements
represents the real thought of the writer or whether either does. If, however,
it is impossible to derive from the study of his writings a consistent impression
of his way of thinking, it is at least possible to get a comprehensive view
of his thoughts. His writings are so voluminous that they are to be reckoned
among the most extensive source materials for the period. The student of Philo
has at least the advantage of being able to follow the author's thought through
the most varied ramifications, even though he is in danger of losing his way
in the mass of conflicting opinions.
In studying the religious experiences of Philo and his contemporaries, we
are concerned primarily with a single phase of religious mysticism, the experience
of regeneration. Since this experience, as then conceived, involved the immediate
relationship of man with the divine, the study of the Philonian formulation
of this experience may properly begin with an examination of Philo's thought
of God.
II
According to Philo's own statement, there were for him two basic problems
in theology. "One is whether there is any deity at all? .... The other question
is, supposing there be a God, what is he as to his essence?" With the first
of these problems Philo as a good Jew had no real trouble, but the second he
pronounced "not only difficult but perhaps impossible." He struggled a great
deal with this problem and generally succeeded in attaining a disheartening
negative conclusion--that God is essentially unknown and unknowable. This, he
argued, was not due to any obscurity on the divine side, but rather to human
limitations. According to his theory, man must first become God--an impossibility--before
he could hope to comprehend God. Philo's ultimate position concerning the essential
nature of God was simply this: We know that God is, but we cannot know what
he is. This bare conviction, he said, ought to satisfy the seeker after God.
"It is sufficient for human reason to attain the knowledge that there is and
exists something as the cause of the universe; but to press beyond this and
inquire into essence or quality is superlative folly." In theory, at least,
that was the conclusion of the whole matter for this Jewish thinker.
It is well known that Philo on occasion emphatically asserted that God is
completely bare of all qualities. Then having emptied the term "God" of all
qualitative content, he proceeded to fill it full again. He was not, after all,
satisfied with the purely negative position that God is without quality. Instead
he went on to make the assertion that God is at once the summation and source
of all the good qualities known to men. In his account of the embassy to the
emperor, he spoke of the Uncreated and the Divine as "the first good and beautiful
and blessed and happy, or if one is to speak the truth, that which is better
than the good and more blessed than blessedness itself and whatever is more
perfect than these." Somewhat like a refrain in the writings of Philo there
echoes the thought that "the active cause is .... better than virtue and better
than knowledge and better than the good itself and the beautiful itself." This
Philonian God, though the summation of all excellent and admirable qualities,
was by that fact superlatively exalted above his creatures instead of united
with them.
Certain other characteristics of Philo's deity completely differentiated
him from men. Philo ascribed to him eternal causality and this, of course, put
God into a class entirely by himself. Similarly, God was immutable while every
created thing, by the very circumstance of creation, was subject to change.
Philo's infinite God was further removed from his creatures by being superior
to the conditions of time and place. In fine, the Philonian God was a personification
of absolute perfection, the only perfect being in all the universe, a being
full and complete in and of himself and entirely self-sufficient. "His nature
is entirely perfect, or rather God is himself the perfection and completion
and boundary of happiness, sharing in nothing else by which he can be rendered
better." All of these characteristics peculiar to Philo's God: his creative
power, his steadfastness, his superiority to time and place, his perfection,
and self-sufficiency served to differentiate him completely from his creatures.
The list of distinctive characteristics might be increased by reference to many
other peculiar attributes. These, however, are sufficient to show on what a
transcendent plane of solitary exaltation reposed the figure of Philo's God.
It is patent that the Alexandrian's conception of deity was an unusually
exalted one. In view of the transcendence of the Philonian God, one might well
question whether any relations were possible between the human and the divine.
Admittedly, if Philo's abstract conception of the deity were carried to its
logical conclusion, all mystical experience would be impossible for men.
III
Although Philo's God was far removed from humanity, man himself was not so
far removed from the divine. The statement, paradoxical as it sounds, is no
more contradictory than Philo's own thought as he expressed it. His idea of
man was dualistic and very like the conceptions of human nature entertained
by Orphics and Pythagoreans. In his opinion, man was a creature of higher and
lower origin with a twofold nature to correspond with his beginnings. Following
the Genesis account of creation, Philo affirmed that "the body was made by the
Creator, taking a lump of clay and fashioning the human form out of it; but
the soul proceeds from no created thing but from the Father and Ruler of all
things." In another important passage in his writings, Philo emphasized the
dual origin of man in mythological terminology obviously borrowed from a gentile
source. Commenting on the Genesis story of the angels of God who became enamored
of the daughters of men, Philo said that these angels were souls hovering about
in the air. Some of the souls, attracted by the pleasures of sense life, left
their pure abode in airy space and descended into material bodies to live. Engulfed
in bodies as in a river and sometimes swept away by the life of the senses,
these souls yet remained on the Godward side of man with a strong tendency to
strive upward and return to the place whence they came. Whether Philo cast his
thought in the gentile forms suggested by Plato or the Jewish forms suggested
by Genesis, his emphasis was the same in both instances, on the dual origin
of man, a being of heavenly origin on the one hand, of earthly origin on the
other.
Corresponding with this view of the genesis of man was Philo's opinion of
the constitution of human nature. Fundamentally, he believed man was a duad,
consisting of a soul and a body. So far as his body was concerned, man was but
a part of the material universe. His physical being consisted of the same four
elements of which the remainder of the cosmos was constituted. "For he is composed
of the same materials as the world," wrote Philo, "that is of earth, and water,
and air, and fire, each of the elements having contributed its appropriate part."
It is curious to find in the writings of an Alexandrian Jew this echo of the
physical speculations of Empedocles and the Ionians.
Since man was thus a part of the physical universe, he shared in all the
imperfections of matter. Philo was conscious of the religious problem involved
by the earthy constitution of the human body, and his attitude on the problem
was a mingled one. Although in one passage he spoke of the body in a Pauline
figure as a "sacred temple of the rational soul," his usual language was very
different in tenor. Like the Neo-Pythagoreans of his own day and the Orphics
of an earlier age, Philo spoke of the body as the prison-house of the soul,
a clog and a hindrance to religious experience. "Away my friend, from that earthy
vesture of yours, he exhorted, "escape from that accursed prison, the body,
and from its pleasures and lusts, which are your jailors." It was a matter of
experience that the body, which was the seat of the sense life, actually weighed
down the aspirations of the spirit. For the Alexandrian Jew, as for the Tarsian
Christian, the body was a fertile seed bed for evil in which natural impulses,
left unrestrained, would come to full fruition in specific sins. On occasion
Philo took the extreme position that man's physical nature was inherently evil
in and of itself. Thus, because of his physical constitution, man was far removed
from the perfect God.
This, however, was only half of the story. Man was not only body but body
plus soul, and by this circumstance he was raised above the level of mere earthly
existence. As a compound being of dual origin, one part heavenly and the other
part earthly, man stood on the borderland between two different realms, his
citizenship in both. The higher element in the human constitution Philo emphasized
equally with, if not even more strongly than, the lower part of his nature.
"The body has been fashioned of earth," he granted, "but the soul belongs to
the ether, a fragment of the divine." By reason of this higher element in his
make-up, man had inherent within himself the possibility of some sort of relationship
with the deity.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that Philo's was not an unmodified dualism
pure and simple. At one important point he complicated his theory by allowing
for a twofold division of the higher element in man, the soul. On the one hand,
Jew that he was, he viewed the soul as vital energy, the principle of life in
matter, essentially irrational and possessed in common by both men and animals.
On the other hand, like a Stoic, he viewed the soul as man's rational capacity,
the impress of divine reason, an element linking the human with the divine.
Of these two parts of the soul the latter was, or should be, the dominant and
superior element.
Philo's conception of the irrational part of the soul with its troublesome
sense-life need not concern us. Like the body it was a negative and deterrent
factor in religious experience. Not so the rational part of the soul, the intellect.
This element belonged peculiarly to man among created beings and served to differentiate
him completely from other animals. Philo reiterated this point with emphasis:
"Man is the noblest of animals by reason of the higher element among his component
parts." This reasoning power not only differentiated man from the creatures
of earth but gave him kinship in heaven and related him, in a way, to deity.
God himself was the creator and archetype of the rational nature, and to this
sovereign element in the human constitution he had assigned the governance of
the lower elements in human nature.
Like contemporary Stoic teachers, Philo isolated in man's rational nature
the all-important human factor in religious experience. In contrast to the material
body and the animating principle, he viewed the intellect as a help rather than
a hindrance in lifting man up to God. Instead of being an alien element, it
was itself related to the divine, and was inherently capable of further fellowship
with deity. Thus, while Philo's conception of God was so exalted as scarcely
to admit of any interrelations between humanity and divinity, his conception
of man was at once a lowly and an elevated one, humble in respect to man's body
and sense life but exalted in respect to man's rational power. The latter element,
Philo believed, itself closely akin to the divine, threw open to man the possibility
for mystical religious experience.
IV
Being a creature of dual nature man was, in Philo's thought, the scene of
an incessant conflict between the higher and lower elements in his constitution.
The body constantly hindered the soul in its aspirations, and the soul was ever
seeking deliverance from the imprisoning body. The rational element constantly
strove to maintain its supremacy and the irrational desires were ever struggling
to free themselves from restraint. In man's lower nature there was a continual
pull away from God.
But Philo also recognized man's yearning for God, by virtue of the rational
soul which was the dominant part of his constitution. Granting that the endeavor
for fellowship with the divine might prove a futile one, Philo was yet convinced
of the worth-whileness of the effort. "There is nothing better," he said, "than
to search after the true God, even if the finding of him should escape human
capacity, seeing that even eagerness of desire to understand him in itself produces
unspeakable pleasures and delights." Logically, then, the next task is to chart,
following the lead of Philo's thought, the various steps in this upward striving
of the soul.
For the man who had neglected his God-given rational heritage, and surrendered
himself to the control of his lower nature, the first step was a realization
of his position, an awakening to the consciousness that in surrendering to pleasurable
cravings he had violated the divinely prescribed order of things for humanity
and dethroned the rational element which should be supreme. In this process
Philo usually thought of man's own intellect as playing the part of conscience.
He spoke of it as the real man, the better self, who in all the critical, moral,
and religious issues of life deserved to have the deciding voice. Philo did
not, however, view this testing and convicting function of the intellect as
a pure exercise of human endeavor, by any means. Recognizing the close kinship
of the human and the divine at exactly this point, be considered the human understanding
as "intimately related to the divine Logos, an impress or particle or effulgence
of the blessed nature," and frequently in his writings Philo represented the
Logos itself as exercising the functions of conscience and arousing man to a
realization of his evil ways.
Under the promptings of this agency man became conscious of his positive
wrongdoings, of his limitations, and above all of his utter humility in relation
to the deity. This humble attitude of self-depreciation in the divine presence
was, in Philo's opinion, a precondition of progress toward fellowship with God.
In a paradoxical statement Philo testified that it was only in this humble frame
of mind that he himself even dared approach the divine presence. "When I perceive
myself to be but 'dust and ashes' and what is even more despicable, then I have
the courage to meet Thee, having become humble, cast down to the ground." The,
preliminary to the soul's progress toward God was the realization, in the glaring
light of conscience, of man's utter inferiority.
The next important step was the active turning away from the life of sensation
and passion, desire and pleasure, which had previously ensnared the soul and
caused its defection. The human intellect, in order to wing its way upward to
the divine, must be freed from all trammels of the body and material entanglements.
Not only must the reason be freed from the domination of the senses and restored
to its governing position in the human constitution, but it must also learn
to distrust itself even and have confidence only in the Uncreated. In words
that have a Neo-Pythagorean ring, Philo commented on Genesis 15:5.
"The mind that is to be led forth and set at liberty must withdraw from all
things, from bodily necessities, from the instruments of the senses, from sophistical
reasonings, from plausible arguments, finally from itself . . . . . For it is
not possible for one who dwells in the body and among mortal men to have communion
with God, but only for him whom God delivers out of his prison."
Later in the same work, Philo addressed an exhortation to his own mind to
withdraw from all physical connections.
"If you seek God, O my mind, go forth out of yourself, and seek for him.
But if you remain in the substance of the body, or in the vain opinions of the
mind, you are then without any real wish to search into divine things, even
if you do put on the appearance and pretense of seeking them."
Fundamentally, therefore, a profound distrust of sensation and a complete
disregard of the body was at the basis of Philo's supreme religious experience,
as it was in the case of Hermeticism.
This distrust of the world of sense was but the reverse of a very necessary
positive attitude of mind. The turning away from the visible world as unreal
must be accompanied simultaneously by a turning toward the invisible as the
only reality. At this point Philo's indebtedness to Platonism became particularly
evident. These two processes, the turning away from the phenomenal world and
the turning toward God, were intimately associated with each other in Philo's
thought and writings. He compared the way of sensation to a slippery path on
which men stumble and fall, and the way of contemplation and trust in God to
a dry high road on which men make progress without hindrance.
In thus disregarding both sensation and reason, man passed beyond the limits
of ordinary rational processes. It required a great perseverance of will to
follow this Philonian injunction, and Philo himself recognized the, difficulties
of the situation. He said:
"If you choose to make a profounder search and not merely a superficial one,
you will clearly discover that it is not easy to put faith in God alone without
dragging in something else . . . . . To clear away all earthly influences and
to distrust the world of becoming which is of itself wholly unworthy of confidence,
and to have faith in God alone, who alone is trustworthy, requires a large and
Olympian understanding, one which is no longer enticed by our worldly interests."
Philo, like Paul, used the word "faith" to denominate this attitude of trust
in God, and if one may judge from the frequency and the emphasis of his references
to faith this personal attitude was almost as significant for the Alexandrian
Jew as it was for Paul himself. He characterized the attitude as that "of the
soul resting and established on the Cause of all things, who is able to do anything,
but who wills to do only the best." Philonian faith, then, not only presupposed
a complete distrust of self and the world but it issued in a glad confidence
centered in the invisible God.
In spite of the handicap with which man started in his whimsical nature,
in spite of a constant tendency to yield to irrational desires and subordinate
the reason itself to the dictates of passion, the rational soul of man, according
to Philo, was constantly yearning for better things. Man's own intellect, itself
an emanation of the divine Logos, was ever busy playing the part of conscience,
arousing man to a realization of his weaknesses and inferiority. If, in response
to this stimulus, man learned to distrust himself and the world and to throw
himself on the invisible God in an abandon of confidence, Philo believed he
was in a condition to come in contact with the divine. The question naturally
follows, Was there from the side of the immutable God any response to this change
of attitude of man's part? Did Philo allow for an approach to man by God to
match man's yearning for God?
V
A priori it would seem that any such action from the divine side would be
unthinkable to Philo. Considering the fact that the Jewish philosopher conceived
of God as pure being, essentially incomprehensible, devoid of all qualities,
except as he was characterized by certain attributes peculiar to himself alone,
it would seem improbable that Philo should admit a generally gracious attitude
on God's part toward mankind as a whole, or an especially favorable attitude
toward those imperfect but yearning souls who were striving for communion with
the divine. Yet such was the case.
In general Philo viewed God as the source of all good for humanity. From
him, as from an exhaustless fountain, there streamed an overflow of divine mercy
that was the cause of everything good in human experience. One of his favorite
epithets for God was "He who loves to give," and he freely expressed the conviction
that the only limit to God's graciousness was man's capacity to receive.
Upon those who had abused their God-given endowments but were conscious of
their mistake, the deity looked with special favor. In a pertinent passage Philo
said that God graciously "makes all things easy" for those who "feel shame and
exchange dissoluteness for self-control and loathe the base phantoms which they
impressed upon their souls." It was not without the definite assurance of divine
help, according to Philo, that the soul started out in quest for the central
experience of religion. In a comment on Genesis 46:4 he elaborated God's promise
"I will go with you" as follows:
"This I do because of my pity for your rational nature, so that by my guidance
you may be brought up out of the Hades of passion to the Olympian abode of virtue,
for to all suppliant souls I have made known the way that leads to heaven, preparing
for them a thoroughfare that they might not grow weary of the journey."
Like the father in Jesus' parable of the lost son, Philo's God went out to
meet the soul that was returning to him, and again like a father he was not
satisfied until the soul had been liberated from its bondage to the body and
conducted in safety to the freedom of its heavenly mothercity. The God of Philo,
beneficent in his attitude toward men in general, was especially helpful to
those who turned away the world and earnestly sought fellowship with him.
Notwithstanding Philo's recognition of God's gracious attitude of helpfulness,
there yet persisted a distinct emphasis on the transcendence of God. One fundamental
assumption that ever remained in the background of his thought and not infrequently
came out into the foreground was the conviction that the Uncreated could not
come into contact with any created being. In spite of man's aspiration and God's
beneficence, there remained a huge gap between the human and the divine according
to the Philonian scheme of things. To bridge this chasm the Alexandrian religionist
had recourse to the idea of mediation, a conception already familiar to Jews
and Egyptians and Gentiles generally, and to philosophers as well as religionists
in Philo's day.
To carry on this work of mediation Philo posited three different classes
of beings operating between God and man. Chief among them was the Logos, a semi-personification
of God's thought or reason. In the theological constructions of Philo, the Logos
held quite as important a position as it earlier held in the ethical thinking
of the Stoics or the physical speculations of Heraclitus. Next in order and
subordinate to the Logos were the powers, manifestations of the divine energy,
who worked what was unseemly for God himself to do in the world. The gnostic
affinities of Philo's thought were apparent in this connection. Finally, there
were the angels who constituted a much more vague category in Philo's thinking
than was usual in the case of a Jew. In their mediatorial work Philo assigned
these beings an important function altogether helpful to mortals.
He drew a picture of the soul following after God and having is the companions
of its journey "those rational powers who are commonly called angels" and the
Logos itself. In the progress of the soul toward God, Philo considered the apprehension
of the Logos as a preliminary stage to the apprehension of God himself, and
he even affirmed, "God can only be grasped by means of the powers which accompany
and follow him." In spite of the gap that existed in Philo's thought between
the human and the divine, he made ample provision for bridging it by means of
mediatorial agencies a part of whose business was to assist the soul in its
quest for communion with God.
VI
When, however, it came to this central experience in religion, the mediating
agencies were for the most part disregarded by Philo and the human soul was
left alone with its God. At this point the one thing that mattered was man's
real kinship with the divine by virtue of his intellect. In so far as that rational
element came to self-realization, it strove for union with the, divine origin
of its being; hence there was in the soul itself an inner urge that impelled
it Godward. The ultimate goal of the soul's endeavor was an immediate vision
of God himself. This, in Philo's estimation, was the supreme experience of the
religious life. He compared it to the laurel wreath that awaited the victorious
athlete. He asked:
"What lovelier or more fitting garland could be woven for the victorious
soul, than the power, with clear vision to gaze on him who is? Truly splendid
is the prize held out to the wrestling soul--to be equipped with eyesight so
as to perceive without dimness him who is alone worthy of contemplation."
Since God was the ultimate being in all the universe, the apprehension of
him was the very summation of privilege. He who had caught that vision, Philo
said, might well pray to stay there without change.
Of the supreme importance of that vision for Philo there can be no doubt.
However, when the modern student attempts to analyze the experience, he finds
it very difficult to get a lucid idea of the thought of the Alexandrian philosopher.
Nowhere does Philo himself analyze the experience in any comprehensive way,
and his references to it are so confused and contradictory that it is not easy
to comprehend his ideas on the subject. it is plain, however, that for Philo
the basic conviction growing out of the experience was the realization that
God is incomprehensible. "When the soul that loves God searches into the nature
of the Existent, it enters into an invisible search, from which the chief benefit
which accrues to it is to comprehend that God is incomprehensible and to see
that he is invisible." The case of Moses was the classical example which Philo
adduced to illustrate this point. In briefest terms, then, the Philonian vision
of God meant a contemplation of the divine being eventuating in the conviction
that he was incomprehensible.
With such a negative result, however, Philo himself was ill content, if we
may judge from his other references to the subject. In the face of his own theory
of the transcendence of God, he persistently asserted, though usually with some
reservation, that the direct vision and the immediate apprehension of God were
possible for humanity. Some there were who were able to overleap the bounds
of the material universe and get a distinct impression of the Uncreated. Philo
went farther and in terms of real enthusiasm attempted to describe such an immediate
experience of God. In one passage, after prescribing certian preliminary conditions,
he showed how the soul might be consecrated as a living sanctuary to God. This
was the glorious possibility he pictured: "Then he may appear to you visibly,
causing incorporeal rays to shine upon you, granting visions of his nature,
undreamed of and ineffable, which are the overflowing sources of all other blessings.
" The usual comparison that Philo employed in attempting to describe the vision
was the simile of light, so familiar in the Hermetic literature. In a more extended
description of the experience he said:
"A bright, incorporeal ray, purer than ether, suddenly shining upon the soul,
revealed the ideal world as under guidance. But the Guide, encompassed by unstained
light was hard to behold or divine, for the soul's vision was obscured by the
splendor of the rays . . . . . Then the Father and Savior, seeing her genuine
longing, pitied her, and imparting power to her sight, did not withhold the
vision of himself, in so far as it was possible for a created and mortal nature
to contain it."
The concluding qualification in this passage was typical of Philo's thinking.
Within the limits of this reservation, he allowed for the immediate contact
of the human and the divine and made a real effort to characterize the resultant
experience. As in this instance the experience was usually described as a process
of mental illumination.
Thus far we have considered primarily the intellectual aspects of Philo's
vision of God. It hid for him, however, a large emotional content as well. The
contemplation of the divine being eventuated in an ecstasy which Philo interpreted
as a matter of divine possession. He told of rapturous moments in his own experience
which especially illustrate this phase of his religious thinking. He wrote on
one occasion:
"I am not ashamed to recount my own experience. At times, when I proposed
to enter upon my wonted task of writing on philosophical doctrines with exact
knowledge of the materials which were to be put together, I have had to leave
off without any work accomplished . . . . . But at other times when I had come
empty all of a sudden I was filled with thoughts showered down and sown upon
me unseen from above, so that by divine possession I fell into a rapture and
became ignorant of everything, the place, those present, himself and what was
spoken or written. For I received . . . . the most vividly distinct view of
the matter before me such as might be received through the eyes from the most
luminous presentation."
This famous account from the writer's own personal experience presents an
unusual case of mental illumination for a particular task; but the phenomena
represented are, in the main, the same as those exhibited in accounts of mystical
experiences to which Philo made impersonal reference. Here was the vacant mind,
the steady contemplation of a great theme, the sudden flood of ideas, and finally
the rapturous sense of possession by divine power. The last factor Philo emphasized
in an address to his own soul. He urged:
"Go out from yourself filled with a divine frenzy like those possessed in
the mystical rites of the Corybantes, and possessed by the deity after the manner
of prophetic inspiration. For when the mind is no longer self-contained but
rapt and frenzied with a heavenly passion . . . . this is your inheritance."
To state the matter very simply and perhaps over simply, as a consequence
of forgetting himself in the thought of God, Philo experienced an ecstatic sense
of divine possession.
One who is familiar with the Philonian vocabulary cannot doubt the importance
of this emotional element in his experience or Philo's own high evaluation of
it from a religious point of view. His language is unusually rich in the vocabulary
of ecstasy. Some of his more familiar terms are enthousiazein, "to be divinely
inspired," korubantian, "to be frenzied" (like the Corybantes), bakeuein, "to
be seized with divine madness," katechesthai, "to be possessed by deity," and
the noun forms ekstasis, "ecstasy," and katokoche, "divine possession," are
of frequent occurrence. In describing mystical experience, particularly in its
emotional aspect, Philo used the most glowing terms of enthusiasm. He characterized
it as a happy intoxication. To quote his own paradoxical words, the spirit in
a state of ecstasy "is kindled into a flame of thanksgiving to God and becomes
drunken with that drunkenness which does not intoxicate." This comparison was
a metaphor that Philo employed more than once. Commenting on the story of Hannah
rebuked for drunkenness during her devotions, he said, "In the case of the God-possessed
not only is the soul wont to be stirred and driven into frenzy, but to be flushed
and inflamed, since the joy which wells up within and makes the spirit glow
transmits the experience to the outward parts." The quotation suggests what
a highly wrought emotional experience divine possession was for Philo, and that
it was not without its physical accompaniments and manifestations.
It is possible, however, to exaggerate the emotional phase of Philo's mysticism.
On the whole the impression one gathers from his writings is that his ecstasy,
however deeply felt it may have been, was of a calm and controlled type that
was experienced in the solitude of contemplation. Philo's whole emphasis was
on the quiescence of the human soul, and his ecstasy was that of one who was
being acted upon rather than acting. To state the differentiation in terminology
that Deissmann has made classical, Philo, like Paul, was a reacting rather than
an acting mystic. Primarily, he viewed the action of God as decisive in the
process, and man's experience was but the reaction to this divine activity.
The trance of Adam when Jahve removed a rib from his body and made woman therefrom
was, to Philo's mind, the prototype of the soul's experience in ecstasy. "The
going forth (ekstasis) of the spirit," Philo said, "is a deep sleep which falls
upon it. It goes forth when it ceases to busy itself with the ideas which impinge
upon it, and when it does not exercise activity upon them it slumbers."I With
special emphasis on the solitary character of the experience, Philo affirmed,
"The most secure method of contemplating the Existent is with the soul alone,
apart from all utterance." In view of Philo's stress on the passivity of the
human spirit in the process, one must conclude that his mysticism was of the
quiescent type.
In summary it may be said that Philo's experience of communion with God involved
the concentration of all man's mental processes on the contemplation of the
divine being and the complete loss of self-consciousness in an exultant sense
of divine possession.
VII
Did Philo consider this an essentially transforming experience--one that
radically changed human nature and made man a new and different creature? There
are clear utterances by the Alexandrian Jew on this point which make it evident
that he believed the experience was a transforming one as long as it lasted.
Philo's theory in this regard was radical. His interpretation of the word "ecstasy"
was a very literal one and at the same time quite distinctive. To him it meant
that man's rational soul not only left the body but even got outside itself.
And when it departed what took its place? Philo was clear on that point also.
Nothing less than the divine spirit came in and replaced the human intellect.
Commenting on Genesis 15:12, he wrote:
"As long as our own reason encompasses us with brightness . . . . filling
our whole soul as it were with noon-day light, we remain in ourselves and do
not experience possession. But when the light of reason sets . . . . ecstasy
and divine possession and frenzy fall upon us . . . . . For the reason within
us leaves its abode at the arrival of the divine spirit, but when the spirit
departs the reason returns to its place. For it is not fitting that mortal should
dwell with immortal."
In this passage Philo cited the case of the prophet as the supreme example
of the replacement of human reason by the divine spirit. It was not the prophet,
he said, who spoke, but rather the divine spirit who made use of the prophet's
tongue and mouth to declare God's will. In view of Philo's sharp differentiation
between the human and the divine and his remarkably high estimation of the latter
in contrast to the former, it is somewhat surprising to find that he does not
shrink from pronouncing his prophets divine. The high point of his appreciation
of the prophetic type is found in the following statement:
"The prophetic mind, when it has been initiated in things and is inspired,
resembles unity . . . . . . Now he who cleaves to the nature of unity is said
to have approached God with the intimacy, as it were, of a kinsman. For, abandoning
all mortal types, he is transferred into the divine type so that he becomes
akin to God and truly divine."
By virtue of the replacement of the human mind by the divine spirit, Philo
believed that a man might be changed from a human into a divine being.
It should be stated immediately, however, that for the generality of men
this transformation was not a permanent one, in Philo's estimation, but temporary
and intermittent. However much the soul might desire to remain in the ecstatic
state of divine possession, most men could not keep so completely concentrated
on God and estranged from the world as was necessary in order to retain the
divine presence. "He does remain sometimes," Philo said, "but he does not dwell
always with most of us." In a passage distinguished for its literary quality
as well as for its religious feeling, Philo depicted the human spirit standing
as in the holy of holies of the temple, completely enraptured with the sense
of the divine presence there in the sanctuary. "But when its divine passion
is stilled," Philo continued, "and its ardent yearning slackens, it retraces
its course from the realm of the divine and becomes man, lighting upon those
human interests which lie in wait for it at the entrance of the sanctuary."
Such, Philo believed, was the experience of ordinary men: a temporary impact
of the divine spirit which, for the time being, operated to divinize a mere
man, but which soon departed, leaving him human as he was before.
Some there were, however, a very few, with whom the divine spirit remained
as a permanent possession. These were men of such steadiness of purpose that
they could once for all cast aside all interest in created things and mere opinions
and reach God with unrestricted and open mind. Moses was the great example of
this type of men. He had entered the inmost shrine and there been initiated
into the sacred mysteries. And not only had he become an initiate but a hierophant
in the mystic cult, a teacher of divine things to those who had been purified.
"With such a man," Philo said, "the divine spirit is ever present, showing him
the way in every straight path." Philo made many references to men of this type
in his writings and characterized them variously. They were the immutable ones
who alone had access to the unalterable God. They were the sinless ones who
were called divine. These men, he said, were "something new, surpassing description
and really divine, existing not by human conception but by inspired frenzy."
Much as Philo had to say about them, they were few whom he numbered in this
favored class. Only Abraham and Moses and a very few others of the great heroes
of his own race were thus classified. But for these exceptions, the permanently
spirit-possessed man of Philo, like the wise man of the Stoics, was an ideal
figure.
The direct study of Philo's writings, therefore, reveals that while in his
thought God and man were so widely separated that mediators were deemed necessary
to bring them together, yet as a matter of religious experience Philo did make
allowance for the possibility of an immediate contact between them. On the one
hand he recognized a yearning for God on man's part that expressed itself in
a realization of man's utter inferiority, a complete distrust of sensation and
disregard of all bodily connections, and a glad trust in God. On the other band
Philo believed that his beneficent God was especially favorable to those who
thus sought communion with him. In solitary meditation upon the incomprehensibility
of God, Philo experienced a mental illumination that was for him the vision
of God. The consequent emotional exaltation he considered to be a case of divine
possession. For the time being, at least, the divine spirit replaced the human
intellect, and the inspired man became a divine being. The experience, however,
was not a permanent one, but intermittent so far as most men were concerned.
There were only a very few men, the great Jewish heroes, whom he believed to
be permanently in this divine state. For the mass of mankind, however, the transforming
experience of mental illumination and divine possession was but a temporary
phenomenon. Philo did believe that individual regeneration was possible. Save
in exceptional instances he did not believe it permanently possible.
VIII
It remains to inquire concerning the genetic relationships of this peculiarly
intellectualized mysticism of Philo. How did it come about that this Alexandrian
Jew conceived the possibility of purifying the human soul by various subjective
operations and finally having it elevated and transformed to rank as divine?
Whence came the influences that convinced Philo of the possibility of such complete
possession by the divine spirit as would enable the inspired man to understand
the secrets of the divine nature? There are in Philo's own writings references
which point the way to a solution of this problem.
The ideal of the spirit-possessed man Philo himself associated with the Stoic
theory of the wise man. With obvious reference to thinkers of the Stoic school
Philo asked, "Are there not even to the present day some of those persons who
have attained to perfection in philosophy, who say that there is actually no
such person as a wise man?" But Philo himself would not say this. For him wisdom
did exist, and in the prophets and patriarchs of his own race he found the embodiment
of this high Stoic ideal. Such men Philo regarded as intermediary between the
human and the divine, less than God yet more than man. His conception was strikingly
like that expressed in the Stoic dicta: "The wise man alone is divine, a prophet;
the wise man alone knows God, is a priest, and practices the divine cult."
Granting that Philo's theory of the inspired human intelligence was a Jewish
reinterpretation of the Stoic ideal of the wise man, it is important to note
the type of Stoicism to which the Alexandrian Jew was indebted. It was not a
philosophy pure and simple but a philosophy that had been modified in the direction
of religion. Just as Stoic thinkers of the Greek world had made use of allegory
to transform myth into philosophy, so in Egypt religionists had made use of
allegory to transform Stoicism itself into a semi-religious system. The union
in Philo's land and in Philo's era of Egyptian religious theories and Stoic
philosophy is exemplified by certain of his contemporaries. There was, foremost
of all, Chaeremon the Stoic, Nero's tutor in philosophy and at the same time
a priest of an Egyptian sanctuary. Hecateus of Abdera, a Stoic of an earlier
period, who accompanied Ptolemy Soter Soter on an expedition to Syria, showed
his religious propensities by introducing spirit into the constitution of the
universe as a fifth element along with the traditional four. Finally, there
was Apion, Philo's great opponent and the bitter enemy of the Jews generally.
Himself an Alexandrian Stoic he exhibited the application of allegory to the
Egyptian God Thoth, "Lord of Divine Words." The admission of Stoic influence
upon Philo's thought therefore leads directly to a consideration of the specific
religious environment in Egypt which operated to transmute Stoic philosophy
into a semi-religions system.
Do the writings of Philo betray a sensitiveness to religious as well as philosophical
influences proceeding from his immediate Alexandrian environment? There was
one group of religious influences to which Philo's works prove at rather notable
indebtedness on his part. These were the stimuli coming from the mystery religions.
Scattered all through Philo's productions there are a great number of references
which prove beyond peradventure of a doubt Philo's familiarity with this type
of religion. Of course he roundly denounced the mystery cults with their secret
ceremonies enacted under the cover of night. For him either the teaching or
the learning of mystic rites was "no small profanation," and he laid down the
absolute rule that none of Moses' disciples might either initiate or be initiated.
No loyal Jew could or would assume any other attitude than this one of outspoken
denunciation. Philo, with all his mystical yearnings, could adopt the extremist
position just because he as a Jew achieved the satisfaction of those desires
in his own reworking of his ancestral religion.
Philo found in the scriptures of his race the sacred discourse that conveyed
to him the secret truth which was the essential feature of a mystery. For the
interpretation of that sacred lore he made use of the allegorical method, just
as allegory was used for explanation in the sacred discourse of the mystery
cults. Philo knew, too, of the various functionaries in the mystery ritual and
the characters in the mystery drama who assisted the initiates to master the
divine wisdom which meant their salvation. But he telescoped these functionaries
and summed them all up in a singIe personage, the guide to the initiate, whom
he called hierophant or mystagogue without distinction. In the heroes of his
race this Jew found the personalities who served as initiators for himself.
Moses was the one to whom he repeatedly referred as the great initiator. God
himself had initiated Moses while in the mountain, and thereafter he was "a
hierophant of the ritual and a teacher of divine things." Philo acknowledged
that he had been originally initiated into the sacred mysteries by Moses. He
did not shrink from speaking of himself as a hieropliant also, and he urged
others to serve in a similar capacity for the uninitiated.
As was the case in the mystery religions, he demanded the fulfillment of certain
preliminary conditions before one could attain initiation into his intellectual
cult. It is fairly clear that the specific requirements he had in view were
of a moral character. In addition to the natural endowment of a good disposition,
there must be irreproachable conduct are one could find the path of life and
be initiated into the true mysteries. Philo also followed mystery practice by
laying upon his disciples the charge of secrecy. Those who were adept in the
lore of his cult were regarded as an esoteric group, and he addressed them with
formulas that were familiar to mystery initiates. From their company all the
unworthy were rigidly excluded. He reiterated the command that the initiated
must not divulge the secrets of "the veritably sacred mysteries" to any of the
uninitiated, lest the ignorant should misrepresent what they did not understand
and in so doing expose it to the ridicule of the vulgar. Like the officials
of the mystery religions, Philo insisted oil secrecy.
For Philo initiation into his intellectualized cult was the entrance into
a new world, an invisible country, the intelligible world where "the purified
mind could contemplate the pure and untainted nature of those things which are
invisible and which are only discernible by the intellect." Hither Abraham went
when he "returned to his fathers" and Enoch when "he was not." This was none
other than the divine and heavenly region that was the locus of immortal life
where Abraham and Isaac, having received immortality, had become the equal of
the angels. Thus it was possible, through participation in the Philonian cult,
to experience a foretaste of the immortal life. The significance of this fact
in relation to the mystery religions of Philo's environment is that they too,
in their ritual featured the passage of the soul to another world and in so
doing gave a present guaranty of immortality.
Thus the cults of Philo's Egyptian environment exerted a large influence
on his figures of speech and his thought-forms as well. When we inquire more
particularly for the immediate religious influences that stimulated his ecstatic
experience of regeneration and guided him in his rather elaborate theorizings
on the subject, the natural place to look for them is in this same religious
environment.
The characteristic contribution of Philo's land to the religious syncretism
of the Roman Empire was the cult of Isis. We seen how this cult gave to the
individual religionist the assurance of spiritual rebirth and the guaranty of
immortality even while he was alive on earth. By means of certain initiatory
rites of great spiritual potency, the neophyte who assumed the role of Osiris
died to the old life of earth and was revived again to new life, reborn for
eternity. These venerable Egyptian rites which from antiquity had been performed
in the land of the Nile, for the benefit of the dead and of a privileged few
among the living, were in the days of Philo practiced on ordinary folk who sought
initiation into the cult.
In the ritual regeneration of this mystery religion, we undoubtedly have
an important and immediate source of Philo's theory of mental regeneration.
He was acquainted with the potent cult practices of the Isiacists--at least
in a general way. He himself was conscious of mystical longings for contact
with the unseen, fellowship with the deity, and the transformation of his ephemeral
human nature into something more permanent and divine--desires which the Isis
cult aimed to satisfy by its elaborate and impressive ritual. As a true Jew,
even though a liberal Jew of the Diaspora, Philo could not think of participating
in those rites. So he did the next best thing. He rationalized and intellectualized
them and found in the experiences of his own mental and emotional life the satisfactions
and guaranties that others found in cult practices.
In the rational part of man's nature he isolated a human element which he
believed to be capable of exaltation and transformation and ultimate fellowship
with the divine. As conditions preliminary to this process, he demanded a profound
distrust of sensation, a great trust in God, and other requirements of similar
character. These exercises corresponded to the physical and moral rigors prescribed
for Isiac initiation. In the individual's quiet and steady contemplation of
the divine perfections, a process which lifted the mind far above earthly considerations
and ended in an ecstatic vision of God, he found the regenerative process in
the course of which human intelligence was replaced by the divine spirit and
man became a divine being. Much more realistically the devotee of Isis, in the
rites of his cult, was given a vision of things divine, and, playing the part
of a dying and rising god, he believed himself transformed into a divine being.
A rite of deification and various other festivities left no doubt in his mind
that the regenerative process was complete. For Philo also there were similar
assurances. His vision of God eventuated in an emotional exaltation, a sense
of being lifted far above earthly things and possessed by divine power. In this
state of ecstasy Philo believed himself actually God-possessed, no longer human
but divine.
For each important step in the process of Isiac regeneration, Philo had a
parallel in his mystical religion. Only he was not at all dependent upon the
external stimuli of cult practices. Philonian regeneration was largely self-induced
and was normally experienced in solitude. It is altogether probable, therefore,
that for his theory of mental regeneration Philo was directly in debt to the
Isiac and other mystery religions of his immediate Egyptian environment, and
that his own very private cult was a rationalization on the basis of his personal
experience of mystery practices with which he was familiar.
The Egyptian origin of the Philonian theory of mental regeneration becomes
all the more obvious when the writings of the Jewish thinker are compared with
the Hermetic tractates. In both literatures the experience was described as
an inward one, involving the phenomena of the mental and emotional life. For
the disciple of Hermes, external rites had but slight meaning and for Philo,
too, they had scarcely no meaning at all. The items of self-preparation for
this experience were practically the same in both cases: man must train himself
to consider the world as illusory, to disregard sensation, and to despise his
body. In this process of self-discipline the Trismegistic prophet and the Jewish
teacher alike stressed the element of human volition. "Have the will, deny the
senses, purge yourself!" they commanded. Yet with all this volitional emphasis
the transforming experience itself was in the last analysis conceived as a supernaturally
conditioned affair. Philo and the Hermeticist as well came to a realization
of this regeneration during a period of reverent silence and quiet meditation.
They both described the experience in glowing terms of light as a great mental
illumination in which they glinipsed a vision of God himself. The immediate
result for the Jew as for the Egyptian was an ecstasy which each interpreted
as divine possession. In that culminating moment the divine spirit flooded the
human soul and temporarily, or permanently, transformed it into divine essence.
From start to finish, therefore, Hermetic regeneration and the Philonian vision
of God exhibited the most striking parallels.
It is altogether probable that the two were genetically and closely related.
Although the Hermetic writings as they stand were later than those of Philo,
they preserved antique elements embedded in them which date the beginnings of
this religious movement far back in Hellenistic times. Hence, if these two intellectual
cults were directly related to each other, Hermetism must be considered the
original and Philonism the derived system. Waiving, however, the problem of
direct relationship, it is certain that both came from the same Egyptian milieu
and were both alike largely influenced by Hellenistic-Egyptian mystery speculation.
Thus the investigation of Philo's mysticism in relation to his immediate
Alexandrian environment reveals the fact that in significant ways the thought
and the experience of this Jew were influenced by the gentile religions about
him. Consciously he remained intensely loyal to the religion of his forefathers.
But he was a man of Hellenistic culture and broad sympathies. Hence his writings
exhibited a marriage of Hebrew loyalty and Hellenistic spirit. Under the influence
of gentile religions he learned to detach the individual man. He came to understand
the general longing of Gentiles for personal salvation and the craving of many
for mystical experience in particular. The latter desire was his own, also,
and in somewhat intensified form. Taught by Egyptian mystery speculation and
cult practice, he learned further to interpret his own religious experience
in such a way as to allow for a mental regeneration that would bring man into
direct contact with God. The Philonian literature, like the Hermetic, shows
how strong and extensive was the influence of the mystery religions even among
those who were not members of a mystery brotherhood. Of the two the Philonian
literature has the greater significance in this particular, because it reveals
the influence of gentile mystery practices on the religious thinking of a Jew.